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SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

- 1. Soviet UN delegate points out change on prisoner of war issue (page 3).
- 2. Soviet Union apparently installing rocket launchers on MIG-15's (page 3).

FAR EAST

3. Peiping-Colombo agreement to permit sharp increase in rubber sales to China (page 4).

SOUTH ASIA

4. Pakistan faces serious financial problem despite bumper crop of jute (page 4).

WESTERN EUROPE

West German official hints at rejection of reduced US aid (nage 5).

3.3(h)(2)

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SOVIET UNION

3.3(h)(2)

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the General Asser	of the Soviet delegation pointed out that there were important differences between the Chinese-North Korean proposal of 8 in prisoners of war and Vyshinsky's paraphrase in embly debate. The Soviet delegate emphasized that ement had omitted the specific details of the original	
spokesman descri	ibed this omission as significant, stating that the he US demand for reclassification.	3.3(h)(
	Comment: The USSR has consistently	
than the Chinese a General Assembly to concentrate on	Comment: The USSR has consistently reflexible negotiating position on the Korean problem and North Koreans. For the remainder of the y meeting, Soviet tactics can be expected to continue undermining support for the US negotiating position of creating dissension among UN members.	
than the Chinese a General Assembly to concentrate on	re flexible negotiating position on the Korean problem and North Koreans. For the remainder of the y meeting, Soviet tactics can be expected to continue undermining support for the US negotiating position d creating dissension among UN members.	3(h)(2)
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Unconfirmed sightings of MIG-15's carrying rockets have been reported from East Germany.



FAR EAST

	FAR EASI	
eiping-Colombo a o China:	greement to permit sharp increase in rubber sales	•
	China is to buy up to 50,000 tons of rubber annually from Ceylon under the terms of a five-year agreement offered by Peiping, according to information received by the	3.3(h)(2)
merican Embass he agreement als 00,000 tons of ric	y in Colombo control of the provides for Chinese shipments to Ceylon of the annually at a cost of 56 pounds sterling per ton.	3.3(h)
		3.3(h)(2)
ffer from the Uni robably ratify the s more than double nd is sufficient to	mbassy in the hope of obtaining a favorable counter- ted States. If none is forthcoming, Ceylon will agreement because of the favorable terms offered. The quantity of rubber under negotiation be the amount obtained from Ceylon in the past year meet China's rubber requirements. Ceylon's reement would effectively nullify the UN-sponsored	•
mbargo on rubbe	r shipments to China and strengthen the growing esia and Malaya for ending the embargo.	
	SOUTH ASIA	·
Pakistan faces se	rious financial problem despite bumper crop of jute	0 0
	Preliminary estimates by reliable trade sources indicate that the new crop of Pakistani jute, which will soon enter the market, may total 8,000,000 bales.	3.3(h)(2)

TOP SECRET

Comment: Despite the fact that India and Pakistan now produce almost twice as much jute as was produced annually prior to 1947, it is probable that they will be able to dispose of the new crop because of present low prices.

The Government of Pakistan normally obtains a major part of its income from export duties on jute and cotton. Since the present price for jute does not permit any substantial export levies, the government faces a serious financial problem.

WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

5. West German official hints at rejection of reduced US aid:

3.3(h)(2)

offer of less than \$100,000,000 in American assistance for fiscal year 1953 might lead the Federal Republic to decline aid entirely. He took the position that aid to Germany should be commensurate with that extended to other countries, and should not be based on need alone.

He also indicated that Germany should not be required to make an early large financial contribution to defense, but should be permitted to strengthen its economic position for the next two years, after which it could make a "real contribution to defense."

Comment: Aid to Germany for fiscal year 1952 amounted to \$106,000,000. It is probable that Germany would decline a substantially smaller amount for the next year if present conditions on use of aid funds were reimposed.



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